

price, but in rehabilitating old houses and making them available for an affordable price. The secret is very simple: donated materials and volunteer labor. In my own community of San Antonio, Habitat has built 81 new homes in the space of 16 years—one about every two months. This is an important contribution, and a significant effort toward meeting one of our greatest needs, which is affordable housing. This bill would enhance the much-needed efforts of community building groups like Habitat.

But there is considerable irony here.

In the past decade or so, the country has lost about 1 million affordable housing units. And, the same Republicans who a few weeks ago voted to save \$30 million or so by killing the Resolution Trust Corporation's very successful affordable housing program 3 months earlier than it would have died anyway, are in this bill claiming a commitment to affordable housing.

And there is further irony: Republicans have bitterly complained over the proliferation of small programs, and so they have insisted on creating vast block grants. In fact one of the earliest block grants was in the area of urban renewal, which was a Nixon-era innovation. But here we are, with a bill that creates a brand-new small program. Certainly it is worthy, but the irony of the block grant party's support for this tiny program is rich indeed.

Of course if we were to talk about housing funding in general, the fact is that this bill would authorize a program that provides about \$1,000 for every \$1 million that the Republicans are cutting from the Nation's housing programs. It is a pitifully small gesture. Yes, it's worthy, and yes, I support this bill because it is at least a recognition that this country's housing needs cannot be met even by the best of completely unaided volunteer efforts. But, I submit that if you subtract \$1 million from housing, and then put in \$1,000 to replace it, no one can believe that we will end up with more housing at the end of the day.

And, if you consider all the cuts in medical care, the cuts in education, the cuts in all kinds of programs that help the poor, the irony is complete: a possible \$1 million per State, to address the problems that will be created by the cuts in the thousands of millions.

But, I am happy to see this small gesture toward decency and community responsibility. I am happy to see this encouragement of those who want to help, and who are doing their best to provide that help. I am glad to see this effort to expand the efforts of the volunteers who help people build their own housing, efforts that are clearly in keeping with the quintessential American spirit of community. This legislation will make a difference in a much needed direction; it is a good thing to do, and it deserves our support.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LAZIO of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, this is truly a historic vote in the true sense of the word. This is the first time Habitat for Humanity will receive approval for Federal funding, and again it is for infrastructure; it is for the most difficult type of funding, frankly, for Habitat for Humanity to be able to get in terms of contributions and charitable donations. This is everything that we talk about. It is leveraging, it is private/public partnerships, it is people working with people, it is getting self-help housing off the ground, and it is true value for the American taxpayers.

We are going to be in a position where we can provide not just a rental apartment, but a house per family for as little as \$6,000, and this will be replicated throughout America with geographic diversity.

I thank the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] for working with me and rounding off the edges of this bill; it has gone so smoothly, and again, I would like to express my appreciation for my distinguished colleague from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] for all of his hard work on the 515 program.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. LAZIO] that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1691, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### SENSE OF HOUSE RELATING TO DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 247) expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the deployment of United States Armed Forces on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement.

The Clerk read as follows:

H. RES. 247

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) in the negotiation of any peace agreement between the parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there should not be a presumption, and it should not be considered to be a prerequisite to the successful conclusion of such a negotiation, that enforcement of such an agreement will involve deployment of United States Armed Forces on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and

(2) no United States Armed forces should be deployed on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] will be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, we are here today to consider a resolution offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MCHALE] expressing the sense of the House regarding President Clinton's announced plan to deploy up to 25,000 of our United States Armed Forces personnel to Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement that may be negotiated among the parties to the conflict.

The negotiators are to meet in Dayton, OH, beginning 2 days from now, and we have been told that they may reach a peace agreement in as little as a week or two.

The problem, from our point of view as elected representatives of the American people, is that we have been told that United States personnel may begin deploying to Bosnia as soon as 96 hours after a peace agreement is reached. Ninety-six hours is not enough time for the Congress to examine the peace agreement and decide a matter as important as whether United States forces should go to Bosnia to enforce it.

So, let us be clear: those who urge us not to pass this resolution today are really urging that the Congress not act at all.

In my opinion, it would be irresponsible for us not to act. The resolution before us does not take a position on the ultimate question whether United States forces should be deployed to Bosnia. Rather, it seeks only to preserve the prerogatives of the Congress in this matter.

This, I believe, accurately reflects the sentiment of the Congress. We are not isolationists, as proponents of sending United States forces to Bosnia have argued. We are prepared to carefully consider a request from the President—but we want to ask some hard questions about the costs, the nature of the mission, the risk to our forces, the rules of engagement, and the likelihood of success.

But we will not write any blank check, and we will not sit on our hands while the President alone decides matters of war and peace. That is why we have brought this resolution to the floor, and that is why I urge my colleagues to give it their enthusiastic support.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, in this past week, major newspapers in this country have detailed, once again, the brutal atrocities in Bosnia.

In Srebrenica, 6,000 Moslems were lined up and shot by the Bosnian Serb Army. The Bosnian Serbs tried to cover up their crimes by scattering the corpses and disintegrating them with acid.

But the details of such brutality would not stay hidden. Who can forget the faces of these children herded into refugee camps?

Who can forget the stories of Banja Luka—where Bosnian Serb soldiers went door to door in search of Moslems?

In a disturbing reminder of Nazism, the Serbs forced Moslems to wear white arm bands. White strips were painted on their houses. People were systematically expelled. Many of them were beaten and robbed. The women were raped and thousands of boys and men are still missing.

That is what is at stake in Bosnia today.

Will the bloodshed continue, or will we act to put a stop to it?

These are just the latest atrocities committed during the past 3 years of terror in Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, we have turned our backs for too long.

We should defeat this resolution today because it sends the wrong message at the wrong time.

On Wednesday of this week, in the city of Dayton, OH, the leaders of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia will work with Americans, Russians, and Europeans to try to bring a lasting peace.

This is a historic opportunity to bring an end to the bloodshed.

We shouldn't prejudge their work.

We must show that we will not turn our eyes from what has happened.

I believe this resolution is a mistake.

It was announced at the last minute on Friday. It was put on the suspension calendar.

It is a travesty to debate a resolution that will mean life or death for millions of people in just 40 short minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to this resolution.

But whatever we do on this resolution today, we must send a strong signal that the American people will not close our eyes to the slaughter of innocent people.

We must support a peace process that can bring the killing to an end.

□ 1700

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MCHALE].

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Speaker, after a speech such as that, just delivered by my friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], so strongly condemning the Serbs, how can we plausibly claim neutrality? The gentleman from Michigan makes my point.

In his introduction to the Constitution and National Security, former

Secretary of State Edmund Muskie wrote:

The initial decision to commit U.S. troops abroad in the face of imminent hostilities is often the most critical decision of all. If that decision is ill-advised, it can rarely be reversed quickly. That's the nightmare about a bad policy decision: Other bad decisions are almost sure to follow in due course. When this happens, and when American casualties begin to mount, it is extraordinarily difficult for either the President or the Congress to extricate our fighting men.

Some people urge Congress to absent itself from the process, so the President can execute policies more effectively.

These prescriptions amount to an abandonment of constitutional control over war-making. These notions presume that combat forces can solve the problem for which they were dispatched. But what if the decision to use force is not well-conceived to begin with? What if the problem is not amenable to a solution by U.S. combat units in the field?

The best way to avoid such national tragedies is to avoid the first momentous lapse in judgment.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the President's decision to deploy 25,000 American ground forces for a 1-year period of time at a cost of \$1.2 billion in order to carry out the completely inconsistent mission of training and equipping just one combatant party while pleading neutrality to the other is a potentially tragic misjudgment. Military forces should not be used merely to establish a diplomatic presence or to accomplish tactical missions unrelated to a clearly defined and achievable strategic purpose.

Did we learn nothing from the deaths of our Marines in Lebanon and the loss of our soldiers in Somalia? That is the issue before the House today.

Secretary Perry has said that the U.S. ground forces would be the meanest dog on the block.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, I would respond with the words of Thomas Jefferson who once said, "We have one effective check on the dog of war, by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body."

I urge an affirmative vote on the resolution.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA].

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, could I ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman of the committee, what effect does this have on the law?

Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman will yield, the effect is that it is a sense of Congress resolution.

Mr. MURTHA. It has no effect at all.

Mr. GILMAN. It just expresses the House feeling about an important measure.

Mr. MURTHA. I understand. But I wanted to make sure.

What I am concerned about, Mr. Chairman, is the possibility of the people who are negotiating after 4 years, and I have been to Bosnia 5 times and I know the Chairman has been over there.

I am concerned they may misunderstand us trying to actually resolve this situation by all at once sending the wrong kind of message.

There is no question that in a sense of Congress, we are saying that American troops ought to be authorized before they are sent.

We are not cutting off funds. We are not doing anything to stop the deployment of troops. We are just saying that a sense of Congress is not to count on it. That is what we are saying.

Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman would further yield, the second paragraph in the resolution really speaks for all of us, that no U.S. Armed Forces should be deployed on the ground in a territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment.

To answer the gentleman's question, there is no mandate or no prohibition, but it is a sense of the Congress asking the President to come to us for approval.

Mr. MURTHA. The reason that I asked the gentleman the question is because of my concern of mixed signals that we could be sending. I think all of us have the same mission. All of us want to stop the fighting. All of us want to contain the fighting.

When I was in Bosnia just a few weeks ago, the people were so happy that the fighting had stopped, the fact that they could continue their lives in some sort of normalcy. I just did not want there to be any mistake by the negotiators that we were actually doing something that would prohibit the U.S. troops. I have a great concern myself about U.S. troops being deployed and at this point would not agree until I saw what the agreement is, and I think we should all take that situation.

I think the President should ask for authorization. But I wanted to make sure that the negotiators did not misunderstand that this is only a sense of Congress and that we have a concern about stopping the fighting, and this does not prohibit in any way American troops from being deployed if the President finally decides to deploy troops.

Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman would further yield, I thank him for underscoring the position of the House with regard to this measure.

Mr. MURTHA. It is a sense of Congress resolution, it has no effect in law, and I would ask the Members to vote against it in order not to confuse the negotiators and reduce our ability to have an impact on settling this peacefully.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER], one of the sponsors of the measure.

Mr. BUYER. I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, leave no doubt that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.

MCHALE] and I in a bipartisan effort support the peace process with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The United States has a key role to play in brokering these talks and providing the leadership not only in NATO, but what we should be doing is providing our air power, sea power, our air lift and sea lift along with our logistical support in the Balkans. That is the role we can play.

There are 3 reasons why I oppose the administration's assumption there can be no peace in the Balkans without U.S. ground troops.

No. 1. The President's premature commitment of United States ground troops to Bosnia without knowing the circumstances surrounding that deployment is ill-conceived and dangerous.

No. 2. It is wrong to send United States ground troops into Bosnia as peacekeepers when there is no peace to keep. This is the lesson of Lebanon and Somalia.

No. 3. History has shown that no long-term military commitment is sustainable without the support of the American people. The Congress as representatives of the people must speak on the issue before troops are deployed.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA] asked some very good questions. The message of this House resolution to the leaders of the warring parties when they sit down to negotiate this peace at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is the syllogism for peace should not be based on the presence of U.S. ground troops to implement whatever agreement is reached. They should focus on the real reasons as to why they are killing each other. Once those are resolved, they will begin to focus on the real reasons of peace.

If United States troops are deployed, do not get the image that 25,000 United States troops will be going to Bosnia with flowers in their M-16's, when in the kill zone peacekeeping looks a lot like combat.

That is why the Secretary of Defense said to us the U.S. troops will be going as combatants to implement an agreement and make peace. U.S. troops will become targets because they have lost the protection of neutrality.

To those that say that this undermines the peace process, it is extremely important that the United States, this Congress, the people's voice, go on the record so we send the correct message to the warring parties to negotiate a peace so that they will stop killing each other.

Support this resolution.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON].

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, the statement by the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman of the full committee, is instructive.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] was concerned that there

would only be 96 hours before a peace agreement were to be achieved and that would not give Congress enough time to act.

Ninety-six hours seems like eternity compared to the time we are getting to consider this resolution laid before the House on Friday when most Members were already back in their districts, 20 minutes of debate equally divided. That is a thoughtful foreign policy debate on the floor. Are we fearful the President will be successful in this peace process?

We were told air power was not going to work. Many of the geniuses in this House got up, "You can't win this war with air power," on both sides of the aisle.

Air power has taken this war to a turn that has brought them to the peace process. The President almost single-handedly has marched forward with that policy and that we now see the potential for an end of mass graves.

I ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], why are we in such a rush that without hearings, without a committee markup, without notice to the Members of the House, that we have to vote on this with 20 minutes of debate? Twenty minutes of debate on whether or not years of effort by the United States, thousands of civilians having died will come to an end.

We have a situation here where 2 weeks in a row resolutions that reserve more time for consideration unless there is some political motive are not given the time for Members of this Congress to examine the resolutions and to debate them in committee.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EVERETT). The time of the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON] has expired.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be granted another minute so that we can respond.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman yield time? The Chair has divided the time equally between the two parties. Is there an additional request for time?

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I believe that a good point was just made by my colleague from the other side of the aisle. This is an important issue.

I ask unanimous consent that an additional 60 minutes of time be devoted to this topic to be divided equally on either side.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object.

Mr. COX of California. If the gentleman will yield, my object here is to extend the time so that we debate it for a full hour. That is 20 additional minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Twenty additional minutes would be 10 additional minutes on each side.

Mr. COX of California. To be equally divided by each side.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, under my reservation, let me say that what the gentleman requests is that we have additional time today. Very frankly I learned about this at about noontime today. I want to make it clear that I am opposed to this resolution and believe it is not timely. Having said that, the gentleman asked for unanimous consent to extend—

Mr. SOLOMON. He wants an extension of 20 minutes. Do you object to that or not?

Mr. HOYER. Further reserving the right to object, I understand that, if we want to extend it to 60 minutes.

I think I am going to raise a legitimate point with the gentleman from California. If somebody is going to object, then I cannot speak any longer.

Mr. COX of California. If the gentleman would yield for a moment, to clarify the point, the reason that we are here on the floor now without hearings, without any further opportunity beyond the hearings we have already had, and we have had hearings in our committee, the President and the administration are going to, in Ohio, within 48 hours commit or begin possibly to commit ground troops.

We want to make sure before they go into those negotiations that we are on record saying do this only with congressional authorization.

It is important that we act tonight. Else we will abdicate. But because it is such an important point, I thought I would ask for an additional 10 minutes on either side, and I would repeat my unanimous-consent request.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH].

Mr. ROTH. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, if Congress is going to be there at the crash landing, then Congress ought to be there at the take-off.

We have experience in Lebanon and Somalia. We also have experience in Vietnam. The very people today who say, no, Congress should not have a voice in it are the very people who in the 1960's and the 1970's were screaming we should get out of Vietnam. Let us think before we get involved.

It is easy to get involved in a war, but it is awfully difficult to extricate yourself.

When the Secretary of State was up here on Capitol Hill before the Committee on International Relations and Chairman GILMAN did such a fine job on that day last April, he said before we put troops into any country, there are four criteria.

What are those four criteria? First of all, you had to have a clear mission. Do you have a clear mission in Bosnia? Do you know what we are supposed to be doing in Bosnia?

The second criteria is that a reasonable chance of success. Who could say we are going to have a reasonable chance of success in Bosnia? They have had three peace agreements so far. Every one has meant nothing.

The third criteria is that support of the American people and a way to sustain that support.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ROTH. I ask the gentleman from New York if I could have at least 30 more seconds, because I think it is important to go over these 4 points.

Mr. GILMAN. I regret that we do not have additional time at this time. We have too many speakers. If we have additional time at the end of the debate, I will be pleased to yield the gentleman additional time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER].

(Mr. HOYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

#### PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry. Before I take the 3 minutes, can I make a unanimous-consent request? Is that in order?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his request.

□ 1715

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent, and this is the point I wanted to make, that this debate which is an important debate for us to have, but it is an important debate to have with notice to Members in time to reflect and frankly time to hear from the public, that we delay this debate and set aside 2 hours for debate on this resolution, that it be open for at least one amendment, 1 week from tomorrow.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Maryland?

Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EVERETT). Objection is heard.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] for 3 minutes.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, the American public again sent us all here to reflect and to be responsible. There was much discussion about that last week.

This is probably as serious a foreign policy issue as confronts the United States of America that will be discussed in terms of topography and all of those things, and that is important to do. "Anybody who moved or screamed was killed. Genocide goes on unabated in the midst of Europe."

The President of the United States and others are trying to bring that to a close. It is difficult to do. I have not,

as most of you know, agreed with the President's policies and have, in fact, opposed his policies and supported very strongly the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. That issue was deserving of serious debate, and it received it. It had extensive hearings and was debated over months of time before we voted on it.

On this noon, I received notice that we were going to debate this resolution on the floor of the House. Fully debate it? No. Under suspension of the rules? Suspension of the rules is designed for the most part for those issues of little dispute and of general agreement. This issue is not one of those. This is a shameful, irresponsible, precipitous action to be proposed in this, the House of the people.

I suggest to my friend from New York, my good friend, that if we were in 1938 or 1939 or 1940 and we were to tell Franklin Roosevelt to not lend lease, "Do not give any aid and comfort to the British, for after all we may get involved," ladies and gentlemen of this House, this is one of the most serious issues that we confront.

I disagree with some of my colleagues. Indeed, the chairman of the committee or the ranking member of the committee and I have seriously disagreed on Bosnian policy. But what we do not disagree on is that we ought to give this considered and thoughtful debate and effort.

The American public expects no less of us, and indeed, my friends, the world expects much more of us. If we are the leaders of the free world, as I believe we are, I would hope that we would reject this resolution at this time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], the chairman of our Committee on Rules.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, let me say this is the first resolution. There will be another much tougher than this.

You know, I have been, I guess, editorialized as one of the toughest hawks in this Chamber over the last 18 years. I am going to tell you, when I stand up here in support of this resolution and in total opposition to sending troops into Bosnia, you know that there is something wrong, because I am concerned about it.

Once again, this administration stands on the verge of putting young men and women in harms' way in this Balkan conflict in which America does not have a vital national interest. This time it may be real, and this is why we in Congress should do everything we can to stop this ill-advised, poorly defined mission, Mr. Speaker, America's children should only be deployed in zones of conflict when and if vital American national interests are at stake, and until this administration, this has always been U.S. foreign policy for all Presidents of this country.

Among other things, our policy has been to come to the defense of sovereign democratic allies that come

under external military aggression: That means invaded by a foreign country. Members, Bosnia does not meet this test. It is essentially a civil war, a conflict.

Mr. Speaker, as heartwrenching as those pictures were, as this tragedy has been, and as despicable as the Serb aggression has been, this conflict does not justify putting one single American soldier in combat. Mr. Speaker, the answer to this conflict is not U.S. ground troops. The answer is the same as it has always been, lift the embargo and let them defend themselves. They have already shown they can do it, and that is what we ought to be doing here today. The next resolution will show that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI].

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, as Bosnian, Croat and Serbian leaders gather around the conference table, there will be one seat for the United States of America, one seat, because we should be speaking with one voice, and only the President of the United States in those discussions can represent this country. That is not indeed to say what the outcome should be.

There is a time and a place when the President of the United States will come to this body with his judgment and express to us what commitments were made on behalf of our country. This resolution today is an entirely different matter. It prejudices what the President of the United States might say. It is an attempt of force our will to that table in those negotiations as if we were two countries, two people, with two different concepts of how to deal with the crisis.

My friends, I understand when we disagree on Medicare, I understand we have different ideas on the budget, I understand we have different concepts about all manner of domestic policy. But this is different. This is the President of the United States attempting to deal with a crisis which could at some point engulf Europe, just cause unspeakable deaths, 200,000 casualties, a massive loss of life, a test of the Western alliance.

At this moment, can we not indeed as one country allow this President, on behalf of all of our people, to at least attempt a settlement and then return to this Congress, where we have a right to insist upon passing judgment upon what commitments he might make for our country? At that time, I cannot say that I would not stand with you and ask questions about his judgment. But at this moment, as these people gather, let him do his will as one President of one people.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. BUNNING].

(Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the resolution H. 247, and in opposition to any attempt to send American forces into Bosnia without the authorization of the U.S. Congress. The American people do not support this adventure and their will should not be thwarted.

The history of the Balkans is gory enough for Hollywood to make movies about until the second coming. The Region is torn by religious and territorial rivalries that span the centuries and one injustice has been answered by another. The United States should not presume to interject itself into this morass.

Many seem to have forgotten that this area has not historically been a unified country which has suddenly come apart. Bosnia has been part of many of the great empires of Eurasia which have come and gone over the centuries. Each time that it has changed hands there has been bloodshed involved.

The region is so well known for its savagery that as long ago as the 15th Century the Ottoman Turks recruited soldiers from that area because of their ferocity. It is folly indeed to think that we will save the Balkans by putting 20,000 young American lives at risk.

The lesson to be learned from previous so-called peacekeeping missions is that the troops are not needed if there is truly peace and that they cannot keep the peace if it does not already exist. Did we learn nothing from our ill-advised adventure in Somalia? Did we learn nothing from the mission to Beirut?

Mr. Speaker, the President likes to claim that this is a NATO problem and if we do not act NATO's credibility will collapse. What nonsense!

The last time I checked NATO was a defensive alliance designed to protect the member states from attack by a non-member, specifically, the now defunct Soviet Union. NATO was not designed to act as Europe's policeman. NATO is supposed to be a shield for Western Europe, not a sword to be used unprovoked, regardless of the beneficent intent.

We should not be a party to this misuse of the alliance. We entered into the NATO alliance for our mutual defense and not one member state is at risk because of the horrors in Bosnia.

What has happened in Bosnia is indeed a human tragedy but it is not a NATO problem and it is not a U.S. problem. It is a problem that the people who live there must solve for themselves. If France and England have determined that they have a vital interest in this war and choose to send their soldiers into Bosnia that is their business. It is not ours.

We need to remind Mr. Clinton that even though the Constitution makes him the Commander-in-Chief of our Military Forces, the Constitution reserves the right to Congress for committing our people to military action.

Article 1 of the Constitution firmly places power in the hands of the Congress when it comes to declaring war, raising, supporting and regulating the military forces of this Nation. This resolution simply reminds him that we must be consulted before American forces are put at risk.

My colleagues, we must support the resolution and let Mr. Clinton know that we will not

quietly sit by while he sends out troops on an ill-advised adventure.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], a senior member of our Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution and emphasize that this Member is deeply troubled by a number of aspects of the proposed troop deployment that is being proposed today. Let me use President Clinton's own words to emphasize my concern.

I rise in support of the resolution. It is important that Congress express its view at this time, because the plan that is presented by the Administration as it has been described to committees of this Congress is tragically flawed in many respects, and we need to make it precisely clear now that we are not on board. We are not on board on this tragically flawed plan.

The Congress should have a role in discussion of this important issue. Let me give you two major examples of why it is flawed. The one proposal is that we train and arm the Bosnian Federation. That violates the cardinal rule of peacekeeping or peace enforcement. You cannot be anything other than neutral if you expect to implement that peace enforcement policy.

The second problem is that we have been given a specific period of time when our peace enforcement are to be pulled out, 12 months hence. Maybe they are going to change that time period. But an exit strategy, which is admittedly all-important, as the President himself said at the United Nations, must be strategically linked. It must be linked to strategic objectives not to a time certain.

I cannot imagine, as a former infantry officer, putting our troops in harm's way when we are both involved in arming one side while we are also supposed to be neutral or peace enforcers. It is important Congress express its view on this issue at this time.

We want the Congress of the United States involved in this issue before American troops are deployed. We want to be involved in the composition of this plan.

In the President's 1993 speech to the United Nations—delivered only days after the loss of United States lives at that infamous ambush in Mogadishu—President Clinton laid out several basic criteria that he claimed would be the standard for future U.S. peacekeeping activities. The criteria set forth by the President included: "Does the proposed mission have clear objectives?" "Can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate?" "How much will the mission cost?" In addition, a later criteria was wisely added—Is it in the U.S. national interest?

At the time that President Clinton made that speech, it seemed to this Member he had laid out pretty sensible criteria. What has troubled me, and what has troubled a great many in

this body, is that these criteria seem to have been addressed in only the most superficial manner.

There are a great many defects in the administrative plans to involve America land forces in Bosnia.

First, look at the question of whether the proposed mission has clear objectives. As Secretary of State Christopher has made clear, our mission is to enforce an end of the hostilities that have plagued Bosnia for centuries. It is proposed that we are going to interject ourselves between heavily armed factions that seem incapable of living in peace. Presumably we are to serve as neutral honest brokers to prevent the three sides from killing one another. Again, this is a peace enforcement mission, not peacekeeping.

But Defense Secretary Perry has testified that we will be prepared to train Bosnian forces and try to bring about arms control if the Bosnian state is to exist after the year of NATO occupation is over. In contrast to the peace enforcement mission—which presumably is not designed to take sides—the arming and training of Bosnian Moslem or Bosnian federation forces is taking sides. Arming the Bosnian federation is not the act of a neutral. I understand the desire to level the playing field, but one can hardly expect the Bosnian Serbs to quietly sit back while their peacekeepers are arming their enemy.

This Member would also say, as a former infantry officer, that it is almost inconceivable to me that rules of engagement can be crafted that will permit us to act as a neutral peace enforcer at the same time that we are arming one specific faction.

It is this type of fuzzy logic and contradictory objectives that can lead to mission creep and, regrettably, the unnecessary loss of American lives.

Now, second, let me turn to the notion of a proper exit strategy—again, one of the fundamental criteria laid out for any United States peacekeeping operation in the President's speech to the United Nations.

This body has been told the exit strategy is to withdraw in a year. But this commitment is not linked to strategic objectives; nor is it linked to any tangible political results. Indeed, it seems that the only criteria in this exit strategy is the belief that 1 year is the extreme outer limit of American tolerance. The administration may be right about that, but it is entirely beside the point.

In moments of candor it has been suggested to be by some of NATO's leading planners and operations people that this 1-year peace enforcement mission will at best provide the region with a brief, NATO-enforced respite during which time the Serbs and Croats fine-tune plans for the ultimate dismemberment of Bosnia. Then, as soon as United States and other NATO forces depart, war returns and the final vestiges of Bosnia are dismembered.

This Member must tell his colleagues that there is no reason to take comfort in a mission that lacks specified strategic objectives, and is likely at best to buy a year of tenuous and imperfect peace. Unfortunately, American, British, French, other allied lives surely will be lost in the process. This Member, for one, cannot justify this inevitable loss of life.

Last, Mr. Speaker, this Member just does not see the clear U.S. national interest in deploying tens of thousands of American troops

to Bosnia. Pointing to our role as an international leader and the critical role importance of preserving NATO seems to me to miss the point. If our pre-announced goal is to stay in Bosnia for no more than 1 year, then are we to be world leader only for a year? Does it serve our reputation to briefly restore order and then permit the violent dismemberment of Bosnia as soon as we depart?

This Member is concerned about the damage to U.S. prestige that could be done by the Congress failing to support the President on such an important foreign policy decision, but I must tell you that this administration went out of its way to avoid consulting with the Congress. It has avoided consulting with Congress because the Clinton administration is fully aware that Congress does not support the proposed adventurism. And I must say that it is the Clinton administration, and not Congress, that threatens deep damage to U.S. international prestige by launching a tragic failure.

It is for these and numerous other reasons, Mr. Speaker, that this Member supports their resolution.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], the distinguished minority leader.

(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge my colleagues to defeat this resolution, which will only make it harder for America to achieve a real and lasting peace in worn-torn Bosnia—a peace that may finally be within our grasp.

Mr. Speaker, none of us wants to see American troops in Bosnia without the prior approval of this body. None of us wants to see America's children sent to Bosnia without a peace agreement that has the full commitment of all parties, and minimizes the risks to our forces. If we are ultimately confronted with that choice, then this Congress—the branch of our Government that is closest to the people of this country—must have a role in deciding and authorizing America's course.

That is why I have no trouble supporting the second part of this resolution. But the first part would do something much different, and much more dangerous, than affirming Congress' rightful role.

On the eve of delicate negotiations on Ohio, this resolution would say to the Serbs and the Moslems: Our negotiations do not have the support of the Congress, or the country. Take their words with a grain of salt. And we stand ready to revoke their promises before they are even made or before they are even discussed in the Congress.

How can we possibly tie America's hands at the very moment when peace is within reach?

If we try to weigh our negotiators down with terms and conditions before they even negotiate, we jeopardize what must be our ultimate goal in Bosnia:

To finally stop the death and destruction. To end what have been the

worst atrocities since World War II itself. To stand up for peace throughout Europe, which has always been in America's best interests.

To second guess the peace process would be more than wrong—it would endanger any hope of a solution to this international tragedy. And it simply is not necessary. The President has already committed himself to consulting Congress, and seeking our support for any U.S. role in securing peace.

This is the wrong resolution, and the wrong time to pass it.

I urge Members to vote no, so that peace talks can at least proceed, without the damaging baggage this kind of bill would be.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], a senior member of our Committee on International Relations.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bipartisan resolution before the House which succinctly encapsulates the concerns of many in this Congress that deployment of United States troops to the former Yugoslavia is a presumed option in the quiver of United States negotiators. Before United States troops are committed to such a mission, the President must make his case to the American people and Congress.

Last August, the President decided to launch a United States peace initiative which was prompted by the sudden shifts caused by the Croatian military gains and by NATO bombing.

Let me remind my colleagues that it was not until Congress overwhelmingly and along bipartisan lines voted to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia that President Clinton finally began to engage on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Mr. Clinton vetoed that bill, depriving the Bosnians of the ability to defend themselves.

In recent weeks this same administration which has vacillated for nearly 3 years over what United States interests were at stake in Bosnia is now prepared to send some 25,000 troops to a country to enforce the peace that has yet to be written.

Mr. Speaker, I am particularly troubled by the comments by key members of the administration that all but promise that U.S. troops deployed to Bosnia would be home within a year. Such claims raise suspicions that the administration's full-court press for a peace settlement is indeed being driven by an electoral timetable. They also reveal the limits of the White House's commitment to its own plan even before it is fully negotiated. Assuming that the sides are able to reach a peace agreement, which is far from certain, the process of consolidating peace in Bosnia will take years, not months, to complete.

This is not a partisan debate. There are skeptics on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. Speaker, it is incumbent upon the President to make a persuasive case to the American people and to Congress, which clearly defines the mission, mandate, and modalities for a force which would be placed in harm's way. Ambiguity, as former Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger has noted, is dangerous and, in the end, self-defeating. The deployment of American troops to Bosnia, as he correctly points out, is a fateful decision requiring a full national debate led by the President. "As a first step, the administration must answer these threshold questions: What exactly is the peacekeeping force supposed to protect? And how do we measure success?" Kissinger has asked.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, I have cosponsored legislation, H.R. 2550, which would prohibit the use of DOD funds for placing ground troops in Bosnia for peacekeeping or peace implementation. The President has not made his case for deployment. And, considering proximity talks and negotiations begin on Wednesday, the White House and Clinton's negotiators need to clearly understand that they must not presume the deployment of U.S. troops is politically sustainable.

Prudence, Mr. Speaker, dictated deliberate and timely consideration of such fundamental points before a commitment of U.S. troops can or should be made. Thorough review and deliberation is prerequisite, rather than rushing into a decision that cannot be sustained over a period of time.

□ 1730

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER], a member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, the people of this country should know that the debate on this issue was limited by an objection from the other side, and the reason we cannot wait for a week to discuss this for 2 hours is because the President of the United States at this moment may be in the process of preparing to send young Americans into the meat grinder of the Balkans. We need to discuss this tonight. We need to discuss this in depth, and we are prevented from doing so by the other side of the aisle.

American policy has been directed by a foreign policy elite that has failed time and time again in the last 3 years. The screams of horror coming from the Balkans have been met with deaf ears in our own State Department and by our own policy makers. They have failed. There has been a moral equivalency to the victims and the aggressors. They pleaded with us, "Please, lift the arms embargo, so we can defend ourselves." That policy that we have followed has been a failure, and now they plan to send American lives.

Mr. Speaker, we have to stop the deployment of American troops in the Balkans, and stop the sacrifice of young Americans on the altar of globalism.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. CHABOT], a member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution. As the Clinton administration makes its final preparations for the Bosnia talks set to begin on Wednesday, it is of paramount

importance that the President gets a strong message from the Congress that the American people do not support the commitment of United States ground troops in Bosnia. A strong bipartisan vote of approval for this resolution will send that message.

This resolution is an important first step, but I emphasize first step Mr. Speaker, I and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle intend to take up binding legislation that will exercise Congress' power of the purse by prohibiting the use of funds for this dangerous and ill-conceived idea.

Put American lives at risk on the ground in the middle of the bloody mess in Bosnia? Have we not learned anything from Vietnam, from Lebanon, from Somalia?

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding this time.

Mr. Speaker, I want to make it clear, I do hope at the right time to help the President in his Commander-in-Chief duties. But this issue, as it comes before us now, is a fuzzy issue, and, of course, if I were to write this less resolution, I would write it a bit differently. But we have before us a proposal for the NATO forces to participate in so-called peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the United States forces would be part of it. I thoroughly agree that the Congress of the United States should be part of this decision, and I hope we can have a full and fair debate at the time.

But as we look at it as of this moment, there are so many unanswered questions, I feel I must vote for this resolution. We must look forward as we ask these questions, what will the agreement say? What is our mission to be as troops? Will they be peacekeepers or peacemakers? What will the rules of engagement be? When can we say we have a successful mission? Will the peacekeepers, if we are as peacekeepers, be evenhanded to enforce the peace against both the Serbs and the Muslims? Will the rules of engagement apply to both? And the most serious unanswered question, Mr. Speaker, that I have in my own mind, is whether at the same time we are there as peacekeepers, we will also be having American troops training, equipping, and arming the Muslims?

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, in order to grant our colleagues the opportunity to more fully debate this important measure, I ask unanimous consent that the time for debate on this measure be extended by an additional 20 minutes, to be equally divided between the proponents and opponents of this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EVERETT). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maine [Mr. LONGELY].

Mr. LONGELY. Mr. Speaker, I rise as a Member who has voted not just once, but twice to support the administration's policy in Bosnia. But I have to stand in support of the resolution that is on the floor today.

Mr. Speaker, Congress has a major oversight responsibility in this area, and I have a grave concern over the two assumptions that we have built into our policy. First, it assumes the use of American forces going into the negotiations, as is spelled out in the resolution. Second, it assumes that we will take a partisan role in support of the Bosnians and the Croats, in training and equipping their forces, when I believe it is our objective and should be to remain neutral in the conflict.

Mr. Speaker, I think that the resolution is very constructive. It does not dictate anything to the administration other than that in the negotiation of any peace agreement, it should not be considered a presumption that implementation of such an agreement will include the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance on my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 6 minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution. The first point I want to make relates to process. I think all of us in this Chamber would agree that this is an important, serious foreign policy question. No hearings were held on this resolution, no committee consideration took place, the administration was not given a chance to state its case before Members, no amendments are in order, the resolution was placed on the suspension calendar without consulting the minority, which is a direct violation of the majority's conference rules, and no opportunity has been given to assess the impact of this resolution on the peace talks that are scheduled to begin on Wednesday.

Now, I understand that they on the other side have made a request for 20 additional minutes, and I appreciate that, but I really do not think that that makes right the process that has been followed here.

We have done this now for 2 weeks in a row on important foreign policy questions. Let me say again that I think it demands the role of the House of Representatives in its role in making American foreign policy by the quick and cursory way in which this matter has been handled today. Most Members were not advised of it until Friday afternoon, some not until this morning.

I am told that Secretary Christopher tried three times from the Middle East this weekend to talk to the Speaker, and the National Security Advisor, Mr. Lake, also tried. I am not aware that those phone calls were returned.

So much for process. Let me say a word about substance. I agree that the Congress should vote on the question of whether to send United States ground troops to Bosnia to implement an agreement among the parties to the conflict, and ideally that vote should be an authorization vote. But no one should mistake that statement with what this resolution says.

This resolution raises a serious constitutional problem. It is one thing to say that the House of Representatives should vote on authorization before the President commits troops to Bosnia. I agree with that statement. But that is not what this resolution says. This resolution says that no United States Armed Forces should be deployed on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment. That resolution says no United States troops should be sent to Bosnia until the Congress approves it, and that is a very different statement.

What we do by that statement is prevent the President from acting as a commander-in-chief, and, when you do that, you raise very grave constitutional issues. If this were simply a statement that we should approve whether to send United States ground troops to Bosnia to implement an agreement, I would agree with it.

Now, there are other reasons to vote against the resolution. It is premature. There is no peace agreement. The resolution presumes to speak about the result of that agreement.

We cannot decide today whether it is wise or whether it is foolish to send United States troops to enforce a Bosnia peace agreement, because there is no peace agreement. That is no request from the President.

This resolution sends the wrong signal to the negotiators to end this terrible war. My friends, we put the Secretary of State into the field to negotiate. We put the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs in the field to negotiate. We applaud what they have accomplished in these last few days. They tell us today, and I quote Secretary Christopher, "This resolution could be seen by the parties and the world as an indication that the House will not support an ultimate peace agreement." The chief negotiator, Mr. Holbrook, says that this resolution is extremely unhelpful and we come along and pass this resolution and undercut our negotiators at a very sensitive time. The Secretary of State says that this resolution is potentially dangerous.

They are the ones that have been negotiating. They are the ones in the field. They are the ones trying to speak for the American national interests. And we just come in and undercut it, by their words. I do not think that is a wise thing for the Congress of the United States to do.

Mr. Speaker, I think this resolution does not pay any attention to reality.



It says that we will address the presumption of the parties to the negotiations. How can we do that? We say in the resolution that there shall not be a presumption. These parties come to the table with a presumption. They have already stated the presumption. How can we in the U.S. Congress tell the negotiating parties, when we are the negotiating party, how can we tell them what kind of presumptions they must have before they come to the table? The Congress has no power to do that.

These are clearly matters beyond the purview of the House. We do not have the power to tell them what their presumptions are. That is precisely what the resolution does. The Members of this body cannot tell the negotiators from Bosnia and from Croatia and from Serbia what they should presume. But that is precisely what we try to do in this resolution. We certainly cannot determine what are our perquisites to a successful negotiation.

Mr. Speaker, this administration has worked very hard in the last few months to end this war in Bosnia, and I urge a vote against the resolution.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the time for debate on this measure be extended by an additional 20 minutes, to be equally divided by the proponents and opponents of this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this resolution be extended by 5 minutes on each side.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I continue to object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. EWING].

Mr. EWING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I would have to say that if we sit quietly by while this action takes place, then it will be too late for this Congress to be heard on this issue. Now is the time for us to express our frustration with sending troops to Bosnia, not after an agreement has been made by the President. Then it will be too late. So today and this resolution is absolutely the time to do it.

The American people do not want troops in Bosnia. If the President wants to send them there, I suggest he come to this body and to this Congress and get approval before he tries to do it. Let us not forget the message and the lesson of Vietnam.

□ 1745

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, we were told about the process. In 48 hours the President is going to ask our troops to go to war. Yes; any process to tell the President that we disagree should be moved up. A lengthy debate should follow. But take a look at our record in Somalia, in Haiti, in the bombing of Somalia and Bosnia, just recently. The lasting effect is zero. We killed Americans and we spent billions of dollars.

Mr. Speaker, this is going to cost us \$1 to \$5 billion. The President will come back and ask for an emergency supplemental. Is it wise? Well, this is Afghanistan with trees. General MacKenzie said he would not touch it with a 10-foot pole. Today, the French President said plan on a 20-year American occupation. Twenty years. Are we ready to make that commitment when we are trying to take care of our own house in this country?

Mr. Speaker, I advise a yes vote on this resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Kansas [Mrs. MEYERS].

(Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. There are serious questions about this possible deployment that must be answered before any leader can in good conscience allow young American men and women to be sent in harm's way.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. Congress should vote before 20,000 to 25,000 American ground troops are sent to Bosnia. There are serious questions about this possible deployment that must be answered before any American leader can, in good conscience, allow young American men and women to be sent in harm's way. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration has not answered those questions.

The administration has not articulated a coherent strategy for our deployment, or expressed what the objective of such a deployment would be. A date on a calendar is not an exit strategy. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have stated our mission would be accomplished in a year. That would make sense if our mission were simply to occupy a patch of territory in Bosnia for a year and then leave. We have to know what changes in Bosnia our troops are supposed to accomplish. We would then have to consider whether it is indeed within the realm of possibility that our forces could accomplish that mission and consider how long it would probably take.

We cannot even get agreement from within the administration as to where our troops would be deployed. Secretaries Perry and Christopher, and General Shalikashvili, testified before Congress earlier this month saying that our forces would patrol the buffer zone between the Croat-Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic in order to keep the opposing armies separated. This weekend,

Ambassador Holbrooke said that our forces would be stationed on Bosnia's international borders. We need to have this information, if only to be assured that the administration knows what its plans are itself, and it is not merely drifting into a quagmire.

We must pass this resolution, and then Congress must insist on having its vote on this deployment before it actually takes place.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. COX].

Mr. COX of California. The resolution before us, Mr. Speaker, is clear and unambiguous. The President should not unilaterally commit 25,000 United States ground troops to Bosnia without congressional approval. Congressional approval for sending U.S. troops into war is no mere formality. It is not a constitutional question, it is a question of whether we want our troops to succeed. It is a question of whether we want the military mission to succeed. It is a question of whether they deserve the support of the American people before rather than in the middle or after. It is a question of protecting our constitutional process under which the Congress, not the President, presumes to commit billions of dollars in U.S. funds to support such an operation.

Mr. Speaker, there is no peace to support. We are sending our troops into the middle. Right now we all know the situation on the ground in northwest Bosnia. There is nothing that distinguishes this, the 35th cease-fire, from the 34th or the 36th. And when this one breaks down the only military mission of our troops, purported neutrals, will be to get shot at just as it was in Lebanon. The Clinton doctrine now emerging is that we will commit U.S. troops to protect the gains of a military aggressor.

Yes, Mr. Speaker, those were the pictures that we saw, naked military aggression committed by such as Slobodan Milosevic. Now we are told it is wise to trust Milosevic's signature on a piece of paper and U.S. troops will risk their lives to plot his gains and his conquests for a precise period of 1 year, following which he will be free to advance.

U.S. troops should not be committed cavalierly. The question is, Should U.S. troops be committed by the President without congressional approval? If we believe the answer to that question is no, vote for this resolution. Vote for this resolution to require congressional authorization.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS].

(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON], a senior member of our Committee on International Relations.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, there is a full court press by this



administration to put young Americans in harm's way in Bosnia, 25,000 of them. No matter that the American people do not want us involved.

Does the President remember what happened in Beirut when 235 Marines were blown apart because they were sitting ducks? Does the President remember the body of a young American, naked and being dragged through the streets of Somalia? And today the problems are just as bad in Somalia as they were back then.

I would just say to the President, if he were here, this a grave mistake. The people of the United States, through their elected representatives, have said clearly do not send our troops into harm's way in Bosnia. It is not in our national interest. Mr. President, listen to the people of this country. Do not send our troops into harm's way. It is going to be a tragic mistake.

Mr. President, you demonstrated against Vietnam and you are about to put us in another situation in another part of the world that is not in our national interest. Do not make this mistake. A lot of young people are going to die. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said very clearly there are going to be casualties, there are going to be deaths. It need not happen, Mr. President.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EVERETT). All Members are reminded to address their remarks to the Chair and not the President.

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of this resolution, I rise today in strong support.

The measure we are considering states clearly that there should be no presumption by any of the parties to the Bosnian peace negotiations that United States troops should be deployed to Bosnia to participate in peace-keeping operations without congressional consent.

I am strongly opposed to the deployment of United States ground troops to Bosnia. I believe there are ways that our Nation can and should help end the bloodshed there. Indeed, we have already played a major military and diplomatic role, and we will soon be hosting peace negotiations. The United States ought to continue to provide air, sea, intelligence, and logistical support to NATO forces in Bosnia. This is a significant contribution.

But the fact of the matter is that none of the combatants view the United States as a neutral party, which is essential to playing an effective peacekeeping role. The administration is attempting to put our forces on the ground under much the same circumstances that our Marines found themselves in Lebanon in 1983. We should have learned from that tragic experience.

Even if we are not targeted because of someone's belief that we are biased, I can easily see one or more of the combatants staging attacks on U.S. personnel designed to look like another party was responsible. They know that the United States has the ability to impose serious damage on any perceived aggressor. They will target our troops in the hope of drawing us into striking hard at one of their adversaries. In Bosnia today this is not even a matter of slipping undetected past

enemy lines to launch a false attack; as Canadian Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, the former commander of UNPROFOR, told the National Security Committee in hearings this month, it is more likely to be accomplished by simple bribery.

Mr. Speaker, the President must know that the Congress has grave reservations about the deployment of our troops to Bosnia. It is my strong hope that this vote will succeed in focusing his attention on the level of concern that resides in the Congress and lead him to rethink his policies.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strongest opposition to this ill-conceived and flawed resolution. I wish to outline for my colleagues the reasons for my strong opposition.

#### A FLAWED PROCESS FOR CONSIDERING THIS RESOLUTION

First, serious procedural irregularities alone justify rejection of this resolution. Mr. Speaker, the difference between a democracy and an authoritarian regime lies principally in the procedural rules that are followed to reach decisions. In a democracy we have rules that assure that full, open and fair discussion and consideration are given to an issue before a decision is taken.

With great fanfare the Republican majority in this House adopted rules at the beginning of this Congress that were supposed to bring greater democracy to the House of Representatives. In practice, however, the Republican majority flaunts these rules and procedures. Today, we are considering this resolution on Bosnia without following House rules that call for committee deliberation before legislation is considered. We are supposed to have proper consultation with the minority before issues are placed upon the House calendar. None of these rules has been followed in this case.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution has not even been considered by the Committee on International Relations—the committee which has principal jurisdiction. The International Relations Committee and the National Security Committee have each held one initial hearing with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those two hearings were held last week. There has been no committee consideration at all of this specific resolution.

There has been no opportunity for the administration to review the text and make its position on this resolution known to the Congress.

The resolution itself was only added to the schedule late on Friday of last week, and until late this afternoon, we did not even have a resolution number or a text of the resolution to review. This is hardly the way a serious deliberative legislative body should be considering major issues of foreign policy and national security. The total of 40 minutes allocated for consideration of this resolution this afternoon hardly can be regarded as adequate deliberation of an issue of this importance.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this is not the first such flagrant breach of the rules of this body. Last week the House also considered legislation moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. That bill was brought to the floor without committee hearings or committee consideration. While I strongly agreed with that legislation, I cannot agree to the blatant abuse of power and the flagrant ignoring of procedure by the Republican leadership. Later today we will see yet another such example

when the House Rules Committee will present a completely closed rule on the legislative branch appropriations bill.

If such a egregious violation of the rules of the House had taken place under a Democratic majority in this body, the shrieks of outrage from my distinguished colleagues on the other side of the aisle would still be echoing. This is the wrong way to conduct the serious business of the United States. These procedures are reminiscent of the regimes whose overthrow we celebrated just 5 years ago.

#### THE TEXT OF THIS RESOLUTION IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND FACTUALLY INACCURATE

Second, Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to this resolution because it is flawed; it is a document that simply boggles the mind. It puts the House on record as making a statement of the views of this House that is blatantly and completely inaccurate. The resolution says that "there should not be a presumption, and it should not be considered to be a prerequisite to the successful conclusion of such a negotiation, that enforcement of such an agreement will involve deployment of United States Armed Forces on the ground" in Bosnia.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, there is such a presumption, and this resolution can and will do nothing to change that presumption. The truce agreement that was negotiated with the involvement of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, as well as the parties to the conflict—the Bosnian Government, the Croatian Government, the Serbian Government, and representatives of the Bosnian Serbs—agreed to participate in the peace negotiations that are to begin later this week in Ohio because they received assurances that the United States and other partners would participate in a peace-keeping force.

If the House passes this resolution, it does not change that fact. To call black white or to call white black does not make it so—even if it is done by a resolution of the U.S. House of Representatives.

#### THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESOLUTION IS TO UNDERMINE THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY

Third, the purpose of this resolution is to undermine the President's authority to conduct foreign policy. No final peace agreement is in place. The President and his representatives who are dealing with the festering problem of Bosnia have made clear in public hearings with members of this body and with members of the Senate as well as in numerous public statements that no American troops will be sent to Bosnia until and unless a peace agreement has been negotiated and accepted by the parties in question. Clearly we have not reached that point. The negotiations are not to begin until Wednesday and they will take some time to conclude, U.S. troops will not be a question until a peace agreement has been reached.

This resolution today is clearly intended to undermine the President's ability to deal with the problem of Bosnia. It is an effort to prevent the possible commitment of U.S. troops at some time in the future, regardless of the conditions under which they might be sent. It is an irresponsible and reckless effort to raise doubts in the minds of the participants in the peace negotiations and ultimately to undermine these negotiations.

This resolution is being rushed through the House in stark contrast to the way in which the Congress considered the involvement of

U.S. troops in the gulf war. On that occasion, President George Bush sent 500,000 American troops to Saudi Arabia. These were not troops on a sight-seeking expedition; these were troops which were positioned on the borders of Kuwait with the clear intention of preventing an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. They were in harms way; they were in danger. The Congress considered the use of U.S. troops in the gulf area in numerous hearings and in numerous meetings with administration officials. When the President and his advisors had clearly defined the scope of what was intended in that conflict, the Congress was asked to consider the use of United States troops against Iraq. The House and Senate debated that issue for 2 full days, and then voted to authorize the use of U.S. troops.

The House of Representatives should reject this present ill-considered resolution because this is the wrong time to consider such an issue. The resolution is poorly worded and is solely intended to undermine the President's authority to conduct our Nation's foreign policy.

THIS RESOLUTION ARTICULATES THE WRONG POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Fourth, Mr. Speaker, the resolution before us today articulates the wrong policy for the United States to follow. We are considering this resolution because 4 years ago the previous administration, in an incomprehensible and excusable fashion, failed to provide NATO the leadership that is now being provided. Let no one make a mistake about this. The 200,000 dead would still be alive. The million refugees would not now be refugees, but would be living in their homes. And the viable multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious community of Bosnia would continue to be a thriving community. It is important, Mr. Speaker, to realize that we did not just arrive at this point yesterday.

It is vitally important for the United States to show leadership within NATO. As we have seen so clearly, NATO works when the United States exercises leadership. It is essential for the United States role in Europe and in the world that we exercise leadership. If we had shown the leadership 4 years ago, as I said earlier, we would not be facing the problems that we now face. Now that the administration is pursuing a policy that demonstrates U.S. leadership, it is important that we not undermine that effort.

I am one of those—and we are a vanishing breed—that does believe that politics should stop at the water's edge. I was one of the handful of Democrats in this House to support President Bush on the uses of U.S. troops in the Gulf war. It is my sincere hope that our Republican colleagues will also see fit to support a Democratic President who is pursuing the correct course of action.

Mr. Speaker, for all of these reasons, I urge my colleagues to reject the resolution before us today.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 247, sponsored by Congressman STEVE BUYER, an able member of the House National Security Committee.

This resolution represents a sensible approach to a fast-moving, complex situation. It neither infringes upon the President's powers nor ties his hands in upcoming negotiations. At the same time, it preserves congressional prerogatives that ought to be carefully guarded.

This resolution represents an attempt by the House to put the administration on notice that it has failed to make the case for its proposed course of action. It also makes it clear that the administration's prior commitment of United States ground forces as a critical element underpinning a proposed peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia is an inappropriate and questionable premise for the upcoming negotiations in Dayton.

To date, the administration has advanced a number of arguments as to why the United States must provide ground troops in enforcing any peace agreement in Bosnia, but all of them seem to raise more questions than they answer.

For instance, the administration has failed to answer the basic question of how American forces can serve as neutral implementors of a peace agreement among parties that view the United States neither neutrally nor impartially. We crossed the line of impartiality in Bosnia quite some time ago by resorting to the effective use of force to compel the conditions that may now actually yield a cease-fire and a peace accord.

However, it is those capabilities and actions that the United States was uniquely suited to contribute that are also the reason why we are uniquely unsuited to serve as neutral peacekeepers. The first rule of peacekeeping is "take no sides, make no enemies." As a result of the application of airpower over the past several months, we have violated the conditions that would permit us to safely and effectively deploy as peacekeepers.

In response, the administration has advanced a number of alternative arguments. First, we are told that European stability is in the balance. Indeed, Secretary Christopher has not been bashful about invoking the specters of this century's world wars and the role of "the Balkan tinderbox" in igniting those conflicts. But badly parsed history is not a substitute for hard analysis. There are no great powers ready to go to war over the Balkans, as there were in 1914. And we've been threatened with the prospect of a wider war now for several years—although it has not occurred. There is a strong burden of proof on those who argue that now, when at last the Balkans are moving toward something like a more natural balance of power, is the moment of great danger.

A second argument we have heard is that NATO solidarity is at stake. But many of the wounds inflicted upon the Atlantic alliance can be traced to inconsistent policy in Bosnia from both past and present administrations. These inconsistent policies have undermined any previous hopes for a cessation of hostilities in Bosnia without offering sustained leadership. And one may reasonably ask whether the solidarity of NATO—still our greatest strategic alliance—even ought to be put at risk to bring peace to the Balkans. The most important future test of NATO solidarity will come over the alliance's expansion. But if relations are being soured through mismanagement or mischance relative Bosnia, NATO will have been broken in pursuit of a secondary issue.

A third concern we hear concerns American credibility. Again, this must be regarded as a self-inflicted wound. Our President took office at the unipolar moment, with American global power unchallenged after victories of the Gulf war and the cold war. Now we are told America must salvage its credibility by bringing

peace to the Balkans; how far have we fallen? And, more profoundly, what lessons will other nations draw about an America that has trouble distinguishing what is, and what is not, a vital national security interest.

Finally, we have been told that there will be no peace without American participation on the ground. This suggests that the warring parties don't have much genuine interest in making peace. Knowing that American participation will only last 1 year is more likely than not to undermine whatever commitment to peace they may have. Advertising, in advance, the short-term duration of any American ground presence in Bosnia may only undermine the mission and endanger American lives.

Mr. Speaker, in sum, this resolution is a manifestation of the growing concerns over unanswered questions concerning the administration's Bosnia policy. I believe it is the least we can do at this point, as we continue to work through the many important issues associated with the President's plan to send over 20,000 Americans into the Balkans.

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 247, to express the House of Representatives' sense that we not rush into the midst of the Balkan quagmire without careful and measured congressional consideration. Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of importance to Europe and to the world. But, as long-time observers of the Balkans will note, peace has never come easily to this troubled corner of the globe.

The ability of the Congress to conduct a national debate on questions of national interest is unparalleled. Look no further than the congressional debate of January 11–12, 1991, on the eve of the Persian Gulf war. Congress, and the Nation, debated whether the national interest called for deployment of military force against Iraq. Without that debate, Congress would have abrogated its constitutional responsibilities to give assent and legal authority to the President to meet his own constitutional responsibilities. I participated in that debate—a debate that I then believed, and today confirm, was absolutely vital to a successful U.S. mission.

I have grave reservations about the need for United States troops in the Balkans. The mission of 25,000 U.S. troops and up to 80,000 NATO troops is uncertain. The commitment of the warring parties to live in peace is questionable. Debate on those questions, however, is for another day—another day soon, I would hope. Today, the question is on whether that debate should happen at all—whether the Congress should debate the United States national interest in the Balkans. The Congress can do no less. Support House Resolution 247.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the administration—President Clinton—is taking an active leadership role in working to resolve the terrible conflict in the Balkans. I agree with many of my colleagues and the administration that we have reached a historical, defining moment in finding an effective strategy to the peace process. Together, the United States and the international community is resolved to press for an equitable, negotiated settlement between the parties to end this terrible war. I applaud the President for unequivocally demanding and working for this peace and for exercising strong U.S. leadership to realize it.

This dreadful conflict in the former Yugoslavia will not solve itself. Much is at stake. This conflict is a threat to our interests in the region: It undermines European stability, our efforts to promote democracy and free markets, respect for human rights, and ethnic and religious tolerance. The war threatens to spread to other countries. I have visited the region, and can speak firsthand of the severe repression, the systematic rape, beatings, torture, and persecution of the non-Serbian ethnic populations by the Serbs. The torrent of inhumanity is numbing. Not since Nazi Germany has the presence of genocide been so apparent, or the need to stop it been so pressing.

Up until very recently, we have acted cautiously, and to my mind, too carefully throughout this war. This Congress, on August 1, by voting the arms embargo on the Bosnians, made a strong statement of support for strong United States leadership and intervention in the process toward peace in the region. Now, because of U.S. leadership and effective diplomacy, we have a cease-fire and a real chance to mediate a peace. What works is when this Government is willing to back up diplomacy with action—and that is what I see us doing now. The Serbs did not respect the U.N. safe havens, the embargoes failed, the U.N. peacekeepers were routinely fired upon and even taken hostage. The idea of peace talks were only taken seriously by the Serbs when NATO bombed Serbian heavy artillery sites and this was coupled with hardnosed negotiating by our diplomats. We have lost good men—diplomats who lost their lives in the pursuit of this peace. We are serious about helping all of the parties reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict. And, the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians now recognize that they have an overriding interest in finding a peaceful settlement.

Now is the time to take these actions that can lead to peace and not to preclude the necessity of providing troops to the region. Without U.S. leadership there will be no peace. Thank you. I urge you to vote against any bill that would harm this historical opportunity for peace in Bosnia.

Mr. Roemer. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of this important resolution, I firmly support House Resolution 247 in the interest of keeping the Congress and the American people fully involved in any decision regarding U.S. troop deployment. The presence of United States troops in Bosnia should not be a precondition to peace. Furthermore, no U.S. troops should be deployed to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has enacted such a measure into law.

A deployment of American troops to Bosnia would be a major long-term commitment of our military personnel. It is our responsibility to debate this.

Last Week, Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili briefed Congress on the administration's deployment plan. After hearing their testimony, it is evident that the plan is developing into a situation which could cost lives. The American military position on this should be clear—are the troops keeping the peace or making a peace? What are the rules of engagement for our troops? What is our national interest in this region of the world?

Congress must have a stronger voice in whether our Armed Forces are deployed overseas to engage in foreign conflicts, particularly in peacekeeping situations. We should assert our constitutional authority before American

lives are put at risk in Bosnia. Congress should have the opportunity to approve a troop commitment to the Balkans before the first soldier sets foot in Bosnia. A Bosnian Deployment would be a major long-term commitment of American military personnel. It should not be done without a debate and a vote in Congress.

We all agree that current policy has not worked and it is clear that we cannot accept the status quo. The killings continue while the number of refugees increases. The efforts of NATO, the United Nations, and the United States have not worked.

Introducing as many as 25,000 troops into the Bosnian conflict would severely intensify the situation, and immerse the United States in training and logistic operations for the foreseeable future. Intensified fighting will certainly risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. We have worked hard to contain the conflict within Bosnia, and we have seen very limited success to date. However, if the fighting spreads as a result of our decision to escalate with the presence of troops, it will be our responsibility to deal with the consequences of our interference. If the conflict spreads to other parts of the former Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, then other regional powers are likely to get involved, which is likely to damage the entire European security structure.

The majority of Americans are opposed to United States ground troops in Bosnia for a variety of reasons, and Congress should not be willing to overlook the concerns of our European allies who have the most to lose in an escalated conflict. American troops will be symbolic targets for those who oppose peace or the partition of Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, I voted earlier this year against lifting the arms embargo for the same reason that I support House Resolution 247: to prevent the Americanization of the Bosnian conflict and the loss of American lives. I strongly urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the resolution regarding sending United States troops to the former Yugoslavia. The language makes a simple statement: no United States ground forces should be employed in Bosnia to enforce a future peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment, nor should United States negotiators assume that United States forces will be committed. The constitutional principle is simple and sound: before the Nation commits its young men and women into foreign military adventures, Congress must act to authorize their presence.

I am appalled by the destruction and loss of life that has taken place over the past several years in the former Yugoslavia. Tens of thousands of people have been killed in the fighting and more than a million made homeless.

There are no easy answers to the bitter ethnic divisions in the region. As with any negotiating process, no solution will prove effective until the various military factions stand ready for a peaceful solution. It is my sincere hope that recent developments will move all sides in the conflict to a lasting ceasefire and eventual peace. I support U.S. efforts in facilitating the negotiations toward this goal.

However, I remain skeptical about the use of U.S. troops to enforce a peaceful solution in a conflict that has been raging for well over

700 years. We have seen all too often how placing U.S. soldiers into a conflict—even with the best of intentions—can easily become a nightmare for our country. Just as important, United States military presence in Bosnia could become merely a target for both sides to vent their anger.

Although I welcome and support this resolution, it is my hope that Congress will take a more universal approach to its constitutional role. For more than 40 years, Congress has allowed the Executive to continuously broaden its authority to put U.S. troops into harm's way. Congress' exclusive constitutional authority to initiate war is routinely ignored by Congress and Presidents alike.

Unfortunately, the current War Powers Resolution implicitly grants broad authority to the President to engage in wars of any size without advance congressional authorization. It requires the President to come to Congress only after he has put the prestige of our Nation and the lives of its soldiers on the line.

I have introduced a joint resolution (H.J. Res. 95) that seeks to reform the War Powers Resolution. The House of Representatives to address the balance of presidential and congressional authority to make war. Indeed, the Constitution demands the collective judgment of the President and Congress on the grave question of war. The time is ripe for a congressional debate on the need to restore the balance of powers between the Executive and Legislature as envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, hearings have not been held on House Resolution 247. The chief participant in the Bosnian peace negotiations, the administration, has not been consulted on House Resolution 247. The American public has not had the opportunity to discuss House Resolution 247 with their Representatives. Common sense tells me that evaluating the merits of a resolution—before passing it—is an essential step in crafting good legislation.

Under the cover of night, hidden away in a back room of the Capitol late last Friday, NEWT GINGRICH and his Republicans decided, once again, to abuse the legislative process for political purposes. This time they are risking peace in Bosnia with their behavior.

Simply put, the Republican leadership has crafted a political document. They are rushing it to the floor without proper consideration. If we are to interfere legislatively with the peace process, let's at least proceed with proper legislative process. Let's have hearings, let's let the people hear the administration and others, and let's hear from the people. None of this has been done.

I wish Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher Godspeed in the negotiations. Their efforts can make the world a safer place, and can return peace and democracy to a desperately troubled area.

There will be a time when it is appropriate for Congress to enter the peace process. That time is not now—this resolution is not now. With serious constitutional and territorial questions for Bosnia hanging in the balance of the Dayton negotiations, Congress should not charge into the middle of the process demanding that all parties bend to our will, or weaken our President's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement.

I do not oppose this resolution on its merits. Peace, with congressional approval, is good. Military deployment, with congressional approval, is good. I oppose the resolution because of the process in which it is being considered. No hearings, no committee consideration, no adequate debate, or discussion.

Let us allow the negotiators to negotiate. If and when they are able to come to an agreement for peace in Bosnia, then let the Congress judge the merits of that settlement.

And in the meantime, let us process important business like this in a proper legislative fashion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.

The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, House Resolution 247.

The question was taken.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on House Resolution 247.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

#### REPORT ON RESOLUTION WAIVING POINTS OF ORDER AGAINST CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 1905, ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996

Mr. QUILLEN, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 104-297) on the resolution (H. Res. 248) waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 1905) making appropriations for energy and water development for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

#### MOTION TO GO TO CONFERENCE ON H.R. 2491, SEVEN-YEAR BALANCED BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1995

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House rule XX, and at the direction of the Committee on the Budget, I offer a motion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. KASICH moves to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2491), to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 105 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1996, with a Senate amendment

thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment and request a conference with the Senate thereon.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] is recognized for 1 hour on his motion.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. SABO] and I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman have the right to yield blocks of time for purposes of debate.

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1800

Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] to engage in a colloquy.

Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman if am I correct that will be five Republican and three Democratic conferees for all titles of the bill under current plans?

Mr. KASICH. The answer is yes.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, in the case of other committees, in most cases, except for those issues relating to tax, trade, and Medicare and Medicaid, there will only be two majority and one minority conferee?

Mr. KASICH. In most cases that would be correct.

Mr. SABO. So, the agreement in those conferences would really be governed by the general conferees, the five Republicans and three Democrats, and then the two from that particular committee of the majority and one for the minority?

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct.

Mr. SABO. So that in an area like agriculture, where we are doing a major rewrite of agriculture policy, there would be 11 conferees; and 3 of them, 2 majority and 1 minority, from the Committee on Agriculture?

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, in the case of agriculture, the Republicans would have three, the Democratic Party would have two.

Mr. SABO. Then that's changed recently?

Mr. KASICH. Correct.

Mr. SABO. But, Mr. Speaker, I would still be eight general conferees and only five from the Committee on Agriculture?

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct.

Mr. SABO. So, the general conferees, if they agreed, would outvote the Committee on Agriculture members 8 to 5?

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, I would not anticipate that happening, but theoretically that would be possible.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, as I think everyone agrees, this is a major rewrite of agriculture policy in this country then being done by five members from that committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from

Texas [Mr. DE LA GARZA], the ranking member on the Committee on Agriculture.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, I come to protest the composition of the conference and to object to going to conference.

Mr. Speaker, the word I had, up until the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] mentioned, was that we would have one conferee from the minority from the Committee on Agriculture. I am now informed that it would be two. Nonetheless, Mr. Speaker, there was a book written once by a great American called "The Arrogance of Power." We are experiencing that at this precise moment.

Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Agriculture debated and voted three times. None of the measures prevailed, therefore, the Committee on Agriculture did not submit a measure by a majority vote to the conference committee. But there is something called the Freedom to Farm Act that was then placed by either the Committee on the Budget or the Committee on Rules in the legislation without any contribution, debate, or participation of the Committee on Agriculture. It was done by the leadership; by the leadership of the Committee on the Budget and by the leadership of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. Speaker, I protest that move vehemently. I think it is an insult to American agriculture. I think it is an insult to the American consumers who are the ultimate recipients of the legislation enacted heretofore by the Committee on Agriculture.

Mr. Speaker, I want my colleagues to know that this is not only demeaning but insulting, that a revamping of the farm legislation is being done with only two members of the minority in the Committee on Agriculture and that they would be outvoted, nonetheless, by non-Committee on Agriculture general members of the conference.

Mr. Speaker, since the beginning of the Department of Agriculture established by President Lincoln, this has not happened. In our bipartisan handling of legislation, my experience here has always been that we come up with a bipartisan approach, consensus approach to the legislation by which agriculture, to some extent rural America, and the consumers would be serving under or receive the benefit thereof.

Mr. speaker, I protest. I know that I have heard it for so many years from our colleagues on the other side that we do not have the votes, so all we can do is expose, Mr. Speaker, the damage that has been done that can be done, that damage that it will do to the legislative system. I think that it basically begins the erosion of this great institution called the House of Representatives, which we once called, and still call, the people's House.

Mr. Speaker, no longer will it be the people's House, but rather it will be by ad hoc committees at the whim of whoever is in the leadership. And if this is the way that we will act heretofore,